AFFIDAVIT
Order 34 2023
I, Iain Clifford, being duly sworn, make this affidavit in support the legal and lawful position regarding my natural identity and inherent rights. I declare under penalty of perjury that the following statements are true and based on my personal knowledge.
I affirm that all facts set forth herein are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. This affidavit is made in connection with legal proceedings designed to clarify the distinction between me as a living man and the corporate entity created by registration.
I was born on 31 December 1965. The registration of the corresponding body corporate was duly executed on 27 January 1966 by the General Register Office. The resulting birth certificate establishes the corporate identity under the name [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP].
I acknowledge that the birth certificate creates a legal record—a corporate entity or “body corporate”—under United Kingdom law. However, I, as a living man, remain distinct from that corporate fiction. In accordance with Genesis 1:26–27 (KJV), I assert that I am a spiritual being created in God’s image—a status that far transcends the legal identity imposed by registration.
I declare that although I reside in the physical realm (“the body”), I exercise my rights as a living man without the constraint of a fixed legal address. The concept of a “fixed address” generally applies only to corporate entities and does not capture my inherent status as a living man.
As a living man, I inherently possess unalienable rights—including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These rights are grounded in historical constitutional instruments such as the Bill of Rights 1689, Magna Carta, 1215, and the Petition of Right 1628, which collectively affirm that such rights cannot be overridden without my express consent.
I declare that the legal case at hand constitutes a constructive trust. Under this doctrine, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is presumed to be the beneficiary, the presiding judge the executor, and the body corporate the trustee. Further, having declared my living status under the Cestui Que Vie Act 1666 and the Cestui Que Vie Act 1707, I assert my claim to the minor estate and appoint myself as the general executor of any related trusts.
My lawful name is Iain Clifford, as confirmed by deed poll. The surname [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP] or [STAMP] appears solely in reference to the corporate identity instituted by the Crown. I do not recognize this designation as representing my status as a living man; any documents referring to [Mr. STAMP] or similar nomenclature do not pertain to the living man I truly am.
I acknowledge that my previous usage of the corporate-associated surname was erroneous. I have rescinded such usage by invoking the doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus—a legal principle permitting the discharge or modification of obligations when underlying circumstances materially change. I served a Notice of Invocation of clausula rebus sic stantibus on 12 June 2024, thereby nullifying any fraudulent representations made at the time of issuance of my birth certificate ab initio. This principle is further supported by Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 62.
I assert that the corporate identity established by the birth certificate with number BXCK 056429, 15299187/1 with connected National Insurance number NI 83 40 80 D is, for legal purposes, a decedent. In this context, no law may convict a decedent to imprisonment. The doctrine of actus reus (the requirement of a wrongful act) and mens rea (the requirement of intent) cannot be satisfied if the defendant is a decedent. Consequently, I, as a living man, do not assume any liabilities or obligations connected with the corporate fiction.
Under the Interpretation Act 1978, Schedule 1, the term “person” as used in statutory language includes both natural persons and bodies corporate. This construction confirms that, while a body corporate is recognized as a “person” for administrative and legal purposes, it is a mere legal fiction—devoid of the living essence and personal agency inherent in a living man. Because the body corporate is created solely through registration and lacks genuine vitality, it is treated as a decedent for many legal purposes. Any legal impositions applicable to a living man Iain Clifford cannot validly be enforced against the corporate fiction designated as [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP].
I declare that the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 12 does not impose any obligations upon me as a living man. In all matters of personal governance, I answer solely to God, and my rights cannot be curtailed by statutory impositions without my explicit consent.
I affirm that no legislation shall bind me as a living man unless I expressly consent to it. The consent of the governed—especially in relation to matters affecting my inherent freedoms—is a cornerstone of my rights, I assert that international legal principles, including those enshrined in natural law and human rights instruments take precedence over statutory constructs that
attempt to transform my natural status into corporate form and I do not grant any statute authority to override those freedoms.
Should Judge Anthony Baumgartner of the Crown Court issue an arrest warrant against the corporate entity [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP], I contend that such a warrant does not apply to Iain Clifford a living man. A warrant pursued under these circumstances would constitute a breach of [ANTHONY BAUMGARTNER] oath and is a serious violation that can undermine judicial integrity and public trust in the system. A judge’s oath typically requires them to uphold the Constitution, administer justice impartially, and protect the rights of the people. If a judge fails to act in accordance with this oath—whether by exhibiting bias, neglecting due process, or prioritizing external interests over justice—it may constitute judicial misconduct.
A breach of the oath is malfeasance in public office and the wrongdoing will be put before a common law jury unless order 34 2023 is struck out and others that are adjoined will also be held personally liable under common law.
I declare that if the case against the corporate entity is not dismissed by [ANTHONY BAUMGARTNER], I shall convene a common law court of record through a sheriff to secure a trial by jury. This is fully in accordance with long-standing common law principles and the guarantees provided by foundational documents such as Magna Carta (1215).
I affirm that the right to a trial by jury is a fundamental inalienable right of every living man. This principle, enshrined in Magna Carta (1215) Clause 39, explicitly states: “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way ruined, nor will we go against him or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.” ensures that truth is determined by a jury of one’s peers in a manner that is both fair and impartial. The Right to Trial by Jury Under Common Law The Magna Carta (1215), This principle has remained foundational within common law jurisprudence, ensuring that disputes are resolved by impartial peers rather than arbitrary decisions imposed by statutory courts. Authority of the Sheriff in Jury Appointment, the Sheriff, as an officer of the law, retains the power to:
Given this authority, the Sheriff has the duty and discretion to uphold common law justice, ensuring that this petition receives fair consideration.
I have issued notices—via certified mail—firmly stating that I am not the corporate entity identified by the birth certificate. Pursuant to the postal rule established in Adams v. Lindsell, 1818, these notices create binding obligations upon all recipients. Consequently, any failure by the recipients (including officials of the FCA and other senior public officers) to act in accordance with my unequivocal assertions may render them liable under both statutory and common law frameworks.
I further allege that officials at the Financial Conduct Authority—including [ALASDAIR MACKENZIE], [PIETRO BOFFA], and [MATTHEW STONE]—have engaged in malfeasance in public office. In pursuing applications for contempt of court and initiating Order 34 2023 in an ex parte hearing, they have relied upon erroneous and misrepresented and invented evidence to attempt to hold Iain Clifford liable as surety for the corporate entity [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP]. This demonstrates a pattern of regulatory abuse by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)—where speculation, preconceived conspiracies, and lack of material evidence are used to justify enforcement actions. In the UK Innovative TI Limited v FCA 2018, [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP] the shareholder and director of UKITI won at the Upper Tribunal on the issue of third-party rights in relation to Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) supervisory notices, in the UKITI v FCA case:
The FCA speculated that [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP] may have breached the general prohibition, despite reviewing evidence that did not support any engagement in fund management.
Such conduct, predicated on misleading representations, undermines the integrity of the judicial system, brings fraud upon the court and will render those responsible liable under common law for malfeasance.
Unless Judge Anthony Baumgartner dismisses the case or properly distinguishes between the corporate entity and the living status of Iain Clifford, I reserve the right to convene a common law court of record, presided over by a sheriff, to conduct a public trial by jury. In such a proceeding, I will seek to hold the Attorney General, the CEO of the FCA, and the aforementioned officials accountable for their actions—including any breach of their oaths and acts of malfeasance. A jury’s verdict in this common law forum would trigger lawful remedies such as the issuance of arrest warrants and other enforceable measures.
In summary, I reassert the following fundamental points:
To ensure clarity and uniformity throughout this affidavit, all statutory and doctrinal references have been updated to conform with recognized legal citation standards (e.g., Bluebook).
Notable improvements include:
The table below summarizes key legal sources and their improved citation formats:
| Source | Improved Citation |
| Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 | Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 12 |
| Crown Proceedings Act 1947 | Crown Proceedings Act 1947, c. 10 |
| Registration of Births and Deaths Act 1953 | Registration of Births and Deaths Act 1953, c. 10 |
| Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties | Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 62 |
| Bill of Rights | Bill of Rights 1689 |
| Magna Carta | Magna Carta, 1215 |
| Source | Improved Citation |
| Petition of Right | Petition of Right 1628 |
| Interpretation Act 1978 (defining “person”) | Interpretation Act 1978, Schedule 1 |
A birth certificate is not merely a record of one’s birth; it is a multifaceted legal instrument with significant implications. According to the document “WHAT IS A BIRTH CERTIFICATE? – The Estate Equitable Title Receipt,” the modern birth certificate evolved from the 1837 Settlement Certificate in England. Originally issued to record the status of paupers and confer a form of legal bondage, it later evolved into a tool that establishes a public trust. In this trust, the Record of Live Birth serves as both an affidavit of existence and a property title (akin to a Warehouse Receipt) that securitizes the individual’s Estate, thereby allowing the state to control and monetize that Estate through various financial instruments. This interpretation reinforces the necessity of clearly distinguishing between my natural rights as a living man and the legal obligations imposed upon the corporate entity created by registration.
Under common law, the county sheriff is recognized as the chief law enforcement officer and the “Chief Executive and Administrative Officer” of the county, as established by historical legal precedent and constitutional principles. The sheriff’s responsibilities include the service of process, summoning juries, executing court orders, and ensuring that convictions issued by common law courts are effectively enforced.
Specifically, the common law sheriff is empowered to:
Historical legal decisions and constitutional principles underscore that the sheriff is the direct executor of the court’s decree and that his enforcement powers secure the integrity of common law justice.
The lawful name, although singular in form, exists under two distinct jurisdictions. As outlined in “The Two Sides of the Lawful name,” the dual nature is represented by two columns or sides:
Additional observations from “The Two Persons Of The State” explain that the State enacts and enforces a corporate persona that operates under regulatory frameworks while the natural person retains the inherent, unalienable rights of common law.
The Crown operates under the colour of law—a legal construct whereby government officials and agencies exercise authority under the appearance of lawful power, even though such power is a legal fiction. This colour of law imparts to the Crown a corporate character that exists solely to administer state functions and impose statutory obligations. As such, the Crown’s actions under the colour of law do not extend to or govern a natural, living man whose inherent and unalienable rights exist outside of these legal facades. In essence, while the Crown may act with the semblance of legal authority under colour of law, such authority is not applicable to me as a living man, whose sovereign rights remain protected by natural and common law.
I hereby declare that all presumptions—whether statutory or judicial—that are traditionally applied by the court to individuals designated as corporate entities or otherwise, are conclusively rebutted by the evidence and legal arguments contained in this affidavit.
Specifically, any presumptions arising from the Twelve Presumptions of the Court or any similar inferential burdens imposed by law are denied. I assert that, as a natural, sovereign living man, I am not subject to those presumptions; all such presumptions are deemed inapplicable to me and are hereby nullified.
I further assert my right to challenge any exercise of authority by public officials through the writ of quo warranto. This ancient prerogative writ demands that any public officer or entity claiming the power to act in an official capacity must demonstrate by what warrant or authority they are holding that office or exercising the alleged power. I invoke the writ of quo warranto to require that any order or process—especially those imposing orders of support or expedited proceedings against me—be supported by valid legal authority. In the absence of such warrant, the claimed exercise of power is hereby declared null and void. Precedents have long recognized quo warranto as a remedy to prevent the usurpation of power and to ensure that any authority exercised is strictly confined to that which is constitutionally granted.
For the purposes of this affidavit, the term “person” is defined as follows:
I further rely on the Cestui Que Vie Act 1666 (1666 c. 11), titled “An Act for Redresse of Inconveniencies by want of Proofe of the Deceases of Persons beyond the Seas or absenting themselves, upon whose Lives Estates doe depend.” This Act provides that if a person—whose presence is in question—remains absent beyond the seas or fails to provide sufficient proof of life for a prescribed period, they are presumed dead and any title to their estate is revested if it is later proven they are alive. In asserting my living status, I unequivocally reject any application of this Act that would imply I am dead or have abandoned my estate. For further verification, please refer to:
This statutory foundation reinforces my claim that, as a sovereign living man, any presumptions based on the Cestui Que Vie Act 1666 are entirely inapplicable to me.
I affirm that God described man in Genesis 1:26–27 as being made in His image and likeness. This divine declaration signifies that man is endowed with the inherent capacity for rationality, moral consciousness, creativity, and the capacity for stewardship over creation. Although this likeness is not purely physical, it confers upon every living man unalienable rights and responsibilities that transcend any state-imposed legal persona.
I assert that the facts and legal arguments set forth in this affidavit remain unrebutted by the Crown or its agents in all prior served Notices. In the absence of any material, presentable evidence—or the consent of the governed—to impose statutory obligations or exercise jurisdiction over my natural, sovereign status as a living man, the authority of the Crown is rendered null and void with respect to Iain Clifford. All presumptions upon which the Crown relies, as presented in this document, lack physical substantiation; therefore, I am not bound by any such presumptions. This affidavit stands as a complete and unchallenged record of my inherent rights, and any attempts by the Crown to assert authority or jurisdiction over me are without lawful merit.
A UN letter sent on 01.12.24 underscores the recognition, under international customary law, that the inherent rights and sovereignty of natural human beings are inviolable. The letter reiterates that state authority derived solely from corporate registration or administrative constructs is a legal fiction that does not authorize the Crown or its agents to exercise power over a natural, living man. This international perspective confirms that any attempts by the Crown to assert jurisdiction or impose obligations upon me, a living man, are without lawful merit.
Based on publicly available corporate records, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is registered as a body corporate entity with an assigned DUNS number. Similarly, although
Southwark Crown Court may not traditionally advertise a DUNS number, research shows that it functions as a body corporate entity created through state registration. I assert that, as corporate entities established by statutory convention, neither the FCA nor Southwark Crown Court—operating solely as legal persons—can exercise jurisdiction over my inherent rights as a living man. Therefore, any statutory obligations or presumptions applicable to such legal persons do not apply to me, and any attempt by these entities to assert authority over me is without lawful merit.
I further assert that the investigatory and regulatory powers granted to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) are applicable exclusively to legal persons—corporate entities created under statutory regimes—and, therefore, do not extend to Iain Clifford as a living man. As a sovereign individual, I am not bound by a regulatory framework designed for state-created entities.
Moreover, I contend that Constraint Order 34 2023 is void ab initio and constitutes an abuse of power. There is no evidence that the body corporate [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP] or any entity associated with MATRIXFREEDOM provides claims management or debt counselling services. MATRIXFREEDOM is an unincorporated private members association that does not require a licence from the FCA. Accordingly, any attempt by the FCA to enforce investigations or to apply Constraint Order 34 2023 against Iain Clifford is without lawful merit and is unenforceable against my natural, sovereign rights as a living man.
In the United Kingdom, individuals seeking freedom from government overreach can rely on several legal protections, constitutional safeguards, and common law principles:
Common Law Rights
Bill of Rights 1689
Habeas Corpus Act 1679
Right to Contract and Free Association
It is a fundamental legal principle that all executable orders, statutes, and contractual obligations must bear a wet-ink signature from the party upon whom enforcement is sought, signifying explicit consent to the terms within. The Baron David Ward Affidavit affirms that any document lacking such a signature is void ab initio and unenforceable in law.
Neither FSMA 2000 nor POCA 2002 carries my wet-ink signature, nor has any agreement been lawfully established indicating my voluntary acceptance of their terms. Therefore, any attempt by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) or other government bodies to impose obligations upon me under these statutes is fraudulent, constituting misrepresentation and coercion in violation of commercial law principles.
Supporting Case Law
Conclusion
The FCA’s enforcement actions, including Order 34/2023, rely solely on statutory presumption, which holds no lawful effect without my signed, express consent. As no valid contract exists between myself and the FCA regarding FSMA 2000 or POCA 2002, all regulatory actions taken against me under these statutes are legally void and must be dismissed for lack of standing and jurisdiction.
I further assert that Order 34 2023 has caused me significant harm and loss. The order unlawfully constrained my lifestyle and fundamental freedoms by freezing numerous [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP] bank and investment accounts and by causing the closure of two UK- registered companies established by [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP]. As a direct consequence of these actions, I have been forced to leave the United Kingdom and operate from a safe haven jurisdiction that does not have an extradition treaty with the United Kingdom. Such measures are not only a flagrant overreach of regulatory authority but also a clear violation of my inherent rights as a living man.
→ FCA regulatory actions must comply with fair procedures, or they are legally challengeable.
I Iain Clifford, holding the office of General Executor of the [IAIN CLIFFORD STAMP] estate, a divine (holy) living spirit, born again, incarnate with life as a man under God’s law, attest and affirm that the aforementioned is true and correct, attested to and submitted by a living,
breathing, self-aware man, under God.
I further acknowledge that this is an act of my free will and Deed.
I solemnly swear and affirm, under penalty of perjury, that the contents of this document are the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
By: Iain Clifford
h4Iain h4Clifford
4th Day June Twenty Twenty-Five.
The undersigned witnesses hereby affirm that they personally observed Iain Clifford execute this affidavit, and that, to the best of their knowledge, the facts stated herein are true and accurate.
Proper Name: Andrew Michael Signature: Andrew Michael
Date: 4th June 2025
Proper Name: David Ayerst Signature: David Ayerst Date: 4th June 2025 Witness 3
Proper Name: Alannah Bowles Signature: Alannah Bowles
I Iain Clifford, Certify the foregoing was provided by UK Special delivery mailed to:
Office of [KEIR STARMER] The Office of Prime Minister 10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA
Office of [KING CHARLES III]
The Office of the King Buckingham Palace London
SW1A 1AA
Office of [RICHARD HERMER] The Office of Attorney General 102 Petty France
London SW1H 9EA
United Kingdom.
Office of [YVETTE COOPER] The Office of Secretary of State 2 Marsham Street
London SW1P 4DF
Office of [ANDREW BAILEY] The Office Bank of England Threadneedle Street
London EC2R 8AH
Office of [NIKHIL RATHI]
The Office of Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority 12 Endeavour Square
London E20 1JN
Office of [ALASDAIR MACKENZIE]
The Office of Criminal Prosecutions Team Financial Conduct Authority 12 Endeavour Square
London E20 1JN
Office of [MATTHEW STONE] The Financial Conduct Authority 12 Endeavour Square
London E20 1JN
Office of [PIETRO BOFFA] The Financial Conduct Authority 12 Endeavour Square
London E20 1JN
Office of [ANTHONY BAUMGARTEN]
The Office of Southwark Crown Court 1 English Grounds.
Southwark London SE1 2HU
Office of [DAME SUSAN ELIZABETH CARR]
The Office of Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) 81-82 Queen’s Building
Royal Courts of Justice Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Office of [SHABANA MAHMOOD]
The Office of the Ministry of Justice 102 Petty France
London SW1H 9AJ
Office
Office of [NICK GOODWIN]
The Office of HM Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) Post Point 1.10
102 Petty France London
SW1H 9AJ
Office of [DAME VICTORIA SHARP]
The office of the Royal Courts of Justice Strande
London WC2A 2LL
Office of [DAME SARAH ELIZABETH COCKERILL]
The Office of the Royal Courts of Justice Strand
London WC2A 2LL
As per Section 196(4) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925) provides that: “Any notice shall also be sufficiently served if it is served by registered post or recorded delivery by virtue of section 1 of the Recorded Delivery Service Act 1962” Furthermore: Under section 127(4) of the Postal Services Act 2000 (PSA 2000) and PSA 2000, Sch 8 Pt II, paras 2–3.